The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), an independent non-profit think tank based in Berlin. Germany, has released a report titled “Digital Threats to Elections: Learning from What Has Worked in Africa.” The report examines the issue of digital threats to elections alongside their intersection with traditional offline challenges, efforts made by diverse stakeholders to mitigate these threats, and what efforts have been successful.
To gather insights from successful efforts that have worked on mitigating digital threats to elections as well as enhancing donor and implementer strategies against digital election threats in Africa and across the globe, GPPi undertook a study and engaged over 100 experts and practitioners from civil society organizations (CSOs), governments, international bodies, and election assistance funders from across Africa through interviews, workshops, and scenario exercises.
The report acknowledges that digital threats to elections are rapidly evolving around the world, particularly, in Africa, and that these threaten to undermine democratic institutions and spark electoral violence despite several efforts by international, national, and local organizations to mitigate these threats. It also notes that there have been limited time and funding which often leaves little room to learn from efforts made during past elections.
GPPi’s report emphasizes that elections as a pivotal point for democracy are vulnerable to fraud and violence borne out of the desire to maintain or seize political power. Digital tools have expanded the strategies used by these actors, including misinformation, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks thereby worsening authoritarian tendencies and undermining trust in electoral processes.
The report highlights a decline in overall freedom and documents cases of internet shutdowns coinciding with elections particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where fragile democracies are prevalent. It notes that misinformation campaigns have not only become pervasive, but, are influencing public opinion and destabilizing democratic norms in Africa. In addition, the digital literacy gap among newly connected populations increases their vulnerability to manipulation.
It notes that digital threats are not isolated but interact with offline realities, amplifying their impact through traditional media, and influential offline actors and that vulnerable groups, including women, LGBTQ individuals, journalists, and civil society activists, face targeted online harassment and surveillance, further silencing dissent.
Through the engagement, GPPi identified four key “building blocks for success” present in programming that managed to mitigate digital threats to elections and explored how different levels of investment (high, medium, and low) can contribute to each of these building blocks.
The first building block it identifies, “Understanding the digital threat landscape” points out that in many cases, funders rely on faulty or uninformed assumptions – often drawn from headlines – about the most pressing electoral issues or the most useful contributions they could make, which have resulted in ineffective or even counterproductive interventions. The study reveals that successful efforts have used baseline surveys, iterative learning and post-programming reviews to target real needs and follow effective theories of change.
The second block, “Varied actors for varied digital threats” shows that when working alone, organizations will always struggle to respond to the multiple issues entailed by digital threats at the scale required. Building of coalitions and collaboration of a variety of stakeholders has proved to be successful through the development of multi-pronged solutions and tackling of a diverse range of threats by sharing information and coordinating actions.
The report listed “Taking an institutional approach to digital threats” as the third block of success. It states that training and building the capacity of institutions have proved to be more successful than building the capacity of individuals including journalists, activists or representatives of electoral management bodies as these individuals are unable to absorb the knowledge they have gained to their institution.
The report states that the fourth block of success in mitigating digital threats to election is “Hybrid fixes for hybrid problems,” and notes that when the goal is to fix digital threats only, there is a great risk of developing strategies that are poor matches for their context. It notes that donors and implementers must bear in mind that digital threats also emerge from and extend to offline spaces.
The political dynamics within and beyond Africa shape the effectiveness of any interventions while international donor support and local political will play pivotal roles, with instances of governments themselves perpetuating digital threats to suppress opposition and justify repressive measures.
The report advocates adaptive strategies that consider local contexts and prioritize sustainable interventions tailored to address the complex interplay of digital and traditional challenges to electoral integrity in Africa.
For more details, please visit https://gppi.net/2024/07/09/digital-threats-to-elections-learning-from-what-has-worked-in-africa.
